Conflict Resolution in Competitive Liberalized Railway Market: Application of Game Theoretic Concepts

Shahin Shakibaei and Pelin Alpkokin ()
Additional contact information
Shahin Shakibaei: Department of Transportation Engineering, Civil Engineering Faculty, Istanbul Technical University, 34469 Istanbul, Turkey
Pelin Alpkokin: Department of Transportation Engineering, Civil Engineering Faculty, Istanbul Technical University, 34469 Istanbul, Turkey

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2020, vol. 22, issue 01, 1-21

Abstract: Public–Private Partnership (PPP) approaches in provision of public infrastructure projects usually involve conflicts. A win–win situation would be the desired goal of such collaborations for both public and private parties. However, stakeholders’ behaviors might result in undesirable worse conditions. Identification and interpretation of the involved parties’ individualistic behaviors to PPP problems can be addressed by game theory where it describes the inclinations and interactions of different parties who are in search of satisfying their self-interest-based objectives rather than system-wide approaches. Outcomes predicted by game theory, which are based on individuality, often differ from those presented by conventional optimization methods and they are more realistic. This study mainly scrutinizes the applicability of game theory into PPP rail projects and conflict resolution. The paper also evaluates the dynamic structure of the PPP problems and highlights the importance of consideration of the game’s evolutionary nature while studying such problems.

Keywords: Game theory; public–private partnership; prisoner dilemma; chicken game; stag-hunt game; Nash equilibrium; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 M21 R42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198919500130
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:22:y:2020:i:01:n:s0219198919500130

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919500130

Access Statistics for this article

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is currently edited by David W K Yeung

More articles in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().