The Marriage Problem with Interdependent Preferences
Mohsen Pourpouneh (),
Rasoul Ramezanian () and
Arunava Sen
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Mohsen Pourpouneh: University of Copenhagen, IFRO, Rolighedsvej 25, Denmark
Rasoul Ramezanian: Department of Mathematical Sciences, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Postal Code 91775-48953, Mashhad, Iran
Arunava Sen: Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre, 7 S.J.S. Sanganwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, Delhi, India
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2020, vol. 22, issue 02, 1-16
Abstract:
This paper considers the Gale–Shapley model with interdependent preferences. Women’s preferences over men are common knowledge but whether or not a man is acceptable depends on the preferences of men which are private information. It is shown that no ex-post incentive-compatible and ex-post stable matching rules exist. A characterization of ex-post incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational and ex-post nonbossy matching rules in terms of modified priority rules is provided.
Keywords: Marriage problem; interdependent preferences; ex-post incentive compatibility; modified priority rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:22:y:2020:i:02:n:s0219198920400058
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198920400058
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