Involuntary Unemployment as a Nash Equilibrium and Fiscal Policy for Full Employment

Yasuhito Tanaka

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2022, vol. 24, issue 02, 1-11

Abstract: This study aimed to provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the analyses of involuntary unemployment by deficiency of aggregate demand and fiscal policy to achieve full employment using an overlapping generations model. We showed that involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers. Moreover, we showed that full employment can be achieved through fiscal policies that create budget deficits in recessionary conditions with involuntary unemployment. Once full employment is achieved, it can be sustained without a budget deficit.

Keywords: Game theoretic analysis; involuntary unemployment; overlapping generations model; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500183

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