Agreeing to Disagree
Robert J. Aumann
Chapter 6 in Selected Contributions to Game Theory, 2025, pp 169-173 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Abstract:
If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for a given event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors must be equal. This is so even though they may base their posteriors on quite different information. In brief, people with the same priors cannot agree to disagree…
Keywords: Economics; Economic Theory; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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