Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud

Robert Aumann

Chapter 9 in Selected Contributions to Game Theory, 2025, pp 219-242 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: For three different bankruptcy problems, the 2000-year-old Babylonian Talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games. A rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in terms of the Talmudic principle of equal division of the contested amount; this rationale leads to a unique solution for all bankruptcy problems, which always coincides with the nucleolus. Two other rationales for the same rule are suggested, in terms of other Talmudic principles. (Needless to say, the rule in question is not proportional division.) Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 026, 031, 043, 213. c 1985 Academic Press, Inc.

Keywords: Economics; Economic Theory; Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789811222610_0009 (application/pdf)
https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/9789811222610_0009 (text/html)
Ebook Access is available upon purchase.

Related works:
Journal Article: Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud (1985)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789811222610_0009

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in World Scientific Book Chapters from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().