Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

Kalyan Chatterjee and Bhaskar Dutta
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Kalyan Chatterjee: The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA

Chapter 3 in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market:Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, 2013, pp 51-77 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets. as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement.

Keywords: Bilateral Bargaining; Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining; Political Negotiations; Multilateral Bargaining; Coalitional Bargaining; Arbitration; Dynamic Model of Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners (1998)
Working Paper: Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners (1994)
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