INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN BARGAINING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Kalyan Chatterjee

Chapter 9 in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market:Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, 2013, pp 193-202 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractThe following sections are included:A MODEL OF BARGAINING UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND THE EFFICIENCY PROBLEMINCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE PRICING PROCEDURES: IMPOSSIBILITY AND POSSIBILITY RESULTSCONCLUSIONREFERENCES

Keywords: Bilateral Bargaining; Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining; Political Negotiations; Multilateral Bargaining; Coalitional Bargaining; Arbitration; Dynamic Model of Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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