Internal Contagion and the Eurozone Economies

Bruno Dallago

Chapter 10 in One Currency, Two Europes:Towards a Dual Eurozone, 2016, pp 387-454 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: In the perspective of the monetary union, the European Union (EU) envisioned a common monetary policy that could deal with symmetric shocks, and national fiscal policies for taking care of asymmetric shocks and national idiosyncrasies. This approach was the only pragmatic solution available, given the incomplete institutional construction of the union and the nearly irrelevant and structural role of the common budget. Particularly limiting were the lack of a common government of the economy and of a lender of last resort, the provisions of no-monetisation and no-socialisation of the deficit and debt and the no-bailout clause. Even fiscal equalisation was actually rejected, except in the indirect, partial and mild form allowed through the common budget.

Keywords: Crisis (International; European); Financial Crisis; Euro; European Policies; European Union; Eurozone; Institutions; Optimum Currency Area (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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