On the Optimal Smoothing of R&D for Abatement Technologies in Monopoly

Luca Lambertini

Chapter 2 in Green Innovation and Industrial Organization, 2026, pp 35-50 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: The private and collective efficiency of investment smoothing in R&D projects for green technologies is illustrated in a monopoly model where the policy maker adopts a time-consistent emission tax and the firm’s reaction includes the parcelisation of abatement efforts in multiple labs. This is also conducive to a validation of the Porter hypothesis in its strong form.

Keywords: Green Innovation; Industrial Organization; R&D Smoothing; Emissions Tax; Porter Hypothesis; Corporate Social Responsibility; Public Eco-Firm; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Environmental Taxes; Voluntary Agreements; Mandatory Regulation; Green Consumers; Green R&D Organization; Environmental Regulation; Sustainable Development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F18 L16 L51 Q5 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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