Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings

Giovanni Rossi ()

Operations Research and Decisions, 2009, vol. 19, issue 2, 75-104

Abstract: This is a quantitative approach to measuring conflict and power in strategic settings: noncooperative games (with cardinal or ordinal utilities) and blockings (without any preference specification). A (0, 1)-ranged index is provided, taking its minimum on common interest games, and its maximum on a newly introduced class termed “full conflict” games.

Keywords: strategic game; conflict; coalitional game; power index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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