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Rationalität und Bindung. Das Modell der Frame-Selektion und die Erklärung des normativen Handelns

Hartmut Esser ()
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Hartmut Esser: Lehrstuhl für Soziologie und Wissenschaftslehre, Postal: A5, D-68131 Mannheim

No 05-16, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: For the Rational-Choice Theory, the explanation of an unconditional commitment to moral and other imperatives has always been a great challenge. Two solutions for this problem have been proposed, which are rooted in the more economically or sociologically inspired social sciences. The first is that effects of an unconditional normative commitment can be included into Rational-Choice Theory when the traditional set of the actors` goals is extended by "moral" motives. The second solution is the notion that unconditional behavioral imperatives are the results of an automatic activation of behavioral programs and thus from a mechanism completely different from instrumental rationality. These two different judgement and decision processes correspond with those described and experimentally analyzed in dual-process theories in social psychology. These are the use of activated mental models based on the actors' learning histories and the formation of future-oriented behavioral intentions. Here, the unfruitful opposition between economists and sociologists is resolved in favor of a third, theoretically integrative approach. This is to use a more general theory to explain which of both modes of judgement and decision making has to be expected. In this perspective, neither the homo oeconomicus nor the homo sociologicus is regarded as a generally valid idea of man, but the underlying theories have special conditions where they apply. The Frame-Selection Model which is presented in this paper is nothing more than a formal representation of this up to now only verbally presented ideas. In this paper, we will discuss and reconstruct on the background of this theory three examples of effects of unconditional imperatives, which can hardly be explained in the framework of Rational-Choice Theory. The aim is to demonstrate that the Frame-Selection Model can be fruitfully applied in order to explain these phenomena.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2005-03-14
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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