Adversarial Bias and Court-Appointed Experts in Litigation

Chulyoung Kim and Chansik Yoon
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Chansik Yoon: Princeton Univ

No 2019rwp-157, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We provide a simple framework in which the level of adversarial bias is endogenously determined in a litigation process. Using this model, we study the e ect of using a court-appointed expert on the level of adversarial bias and the average error rates, and nd an interesting trade-o : although the judge can reduce the number of mistakes at trial by consulting a court-appointed expert, litigants choose to hire a biased expert more frequently in response, which increases the level of adversarial bias, thereby inducing evidence distortion more often.

Pages: 16pages
Date: 2019-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2019rwp-157

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