A Model of offensive versus Defensive Technology: When Does Terrorism Occur?

Jin Yeub Kim
Additional contact information
Jin Yeub Kim: Yonsei Univ

No 2020rwp-173, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: Offense-defense theory argues that conflict and war are more likely when offense has the advantage over defense. This paper explores how the prime hy- potheses in offense-defense theory can be challenged when it comes to making predictions about conflicts or terrorism caused by revisionist states. To do so, I propose a model of a continuous time conflict game between two asymmetric states, in which a status quo state develops defensive technology and a revi- sionist state develops offensive technology, with incomplete information on the revisionist state's militancy level. The equilibrium analysis shows that the risk of terrorism is maximized when the overall offense-defense balance is relatively even. This paper suggests an alternative framework in explaining asymmetric conflicts in the contemporary context, and provides insights into understanding the likelihood of terrorism.

Keywords: military technology; offense-defense balance; conict; terrorism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33pages
Date: 2020-06
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://121.254.254.220/repec/yon/wpaper/2020rwp-173.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yon:wpaper:2020rwp-173

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by YERI ().