Biased Mediation: Selection and Effectiveness

Jin Yeub Kim and Jong Jae Lee
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Jin Yeub Kim: Yonsei University
Jong Jae Lee: The Catholic University of Korea

No 2024rwp-230, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: This paper presents a theory of mediator selection in conflicts that compares biased mediation and unbiased mediation. We determine when and how parties in dispute accept a biased mediator, and characterize optimal mechanisms used by biased mediators when they are selected into mediation in equilibrium. When asymmetric information is significant, parties accept biased mediation as long as the degree of mediator bias is not too high. Biased mediators care more about the payoffs of their favored party. Nevertheless, we find that biased mediators can be equally effective in promoting peace as the unbiased mediator. This implies that, once selected into mediation, the mediator’s effectiveness is independent of the degree of mediator bias. The key force of our results is that a biased mediator’s optimal recommendation strategies allocate more shares of resource to the favored party while providing a higher chance of a peaceful settlement to the disfavored party.

Keywords: Biased Mediation; Conflict; Mechanism Design; Mediator Selection. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D82 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44pages
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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