Anonymous voting in a heterogeneous society

Yaron Azrieli, Ritesh Jain and Semin Kim
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Yaron Azrieli: The Ohio State University
Ritesh Jain: University of Liverpool
Semin Kim: Yonsei University

No 2025rwp-265, Working papers from Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute

Abstract: We study the design of voting mechanisms in a binary social choice environment where agents' cardinal valuations are independent but not necessarily identically distributed. The mechanism must be anonymous - the outcome is invariant to permutations of the reported values. We show that if there are two agents then expected welfare is always maximized by an ordinal majority rule, but with three or more agents there are environments in which cardinal mechanisms that take into account preference intensities outperform any ordinal mechanism.

Pages: 21pages
Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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