Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

Martin Shubik and David Eric Smith ()
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David Eric Smith: Santa Fe Institute, Economics

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.

Keywords: Strategic Market Games; Clearinghouses; Credit Evaluation; Default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D40 D50 G10 G20 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-28
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Related works:
Journal Article: Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry (2007)
Working Paper: Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm378

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