Lessons Learned: Jason Cave

Vincient Arnold () and Greg Feldberg ()
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Vincient Arnold: YPFS, Yale School of Management, https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/
Greg Feldberg: YPFS, Yale School of Management, https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/

Journal of Financial Crises, 2024, vol. 6, issue 4, 141-146

Abstract: Jason Cave was the senior adviser to the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 2008 to 2011 and the deputy director of the Division of Complex Financial Institutions at the FDIC from 2011 to 2013. This Lessons Learned summary is based on an interview with Cave held on April 8, 2024. During the interview, Cave discussed the so-called ring-fencing arrangements planned, considered, or executed between various agencies of the US government--the Federal Reserve, Department of the Treasury, and FDIC--and three banks: Wachovia, Citigroup, and Bank of America. These arrangements, sometimes referred to as wraps or risk shields, were agreements through which the government parties would guarantee a designated pool of assets, subject to some loss-sharing amounts. For example, a bank might agree to take the first $10 billion in losses on the asset pool, after which any losses would be borne 90% by government parties. These arrangements were meant to provide confidence in the banks by setting a floor on the losses they could suffer from asset impairments.

Keywords: Bank of America; Citigroup; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Global Financial Crisis (GFC); resolution; ring-fence arrangement; Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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