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Multiple equilibria? Don't panic! - A hitchhiker's guide to global games

Kartik Anand and Philipp Johann König

No 05/2026, Discussion Papers from Deutsche Bundesbank

Abstract: This article provides a practical overview for applying the global games approach to solve models with multiple equilibria that are often used in discussions on fi- nancial and macroprudential policies. Global games offer a tractable approach to resolve multiple equilibria by introducing incomplete information, thereby yield- ing unique equilibrium predictions. The article proceeds along the lines of a simple regime change game with strategic complementarities. Starting from the canonical regime change game with homogeneous players, it extends the discus- sion to include heterogeneous groups of players and interlinkages across different institutions with different sets of players. These extensions highlight not only how strategic complementarities can amplify fragility across players and institu- tions but also how heterogeneity and interlinkages affects the design of micro- and macroprudential policy interventions. Finally, the article briefly discusses the application of global games to dynamic coordination games.

Keywords: Global Games; Multiple Equilibria; Coordination Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bubdps:337465

DOI: 10.71734/DP-2026-5

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