The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives

Elisabeth Kempf

No 258, Working Papers from The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State

Keywords: Revolving Door; Credit Ratings; Securitized Finance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:258

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