Property rights and social institutions in urban Africa: Experimental evidence from a land formalization program in the DRC

Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek and Jonathan Weigel

No 383, Working Papers from The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State

Abstract: Formal property rights to land remain rare in sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that social institutions shape citizens' demand for land formalization. When offered the opportunity to formalize, citizens weigh the insurance and tenure-security benefits of informal institutions against their monetary and social obligations. We study a randomized land titling program in a large Congolese city that sharply reduced the costs of acquiring a title. The program caused large increases in both initiation and receipt of titles. Demand was strongest among citizens more engaged in social institutions and more connected to city chiefs, yet such ties did not predict completion of the titling process. Program assignment also reduced citizens' participation in social institutions and worsened their evaluations of chiefs. These findings suggest that, in urban settings where land values are higher and social institutions are more costly, citizens may exit social institutions when formal alternatives become available, illustrating how formalization can reshape engagement with informal authority.

Date: 2026
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