Party factions and candidate selection

Christine T. Bangum, Jon H. Fiva, Giovanna M. Invernizzi, Carlo Prato and Janne Tukiainen

No 391, Working Papers from The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State

Abstract: We study how political parties share power internally by analyzing the allocation of list positions to different factions. We develop a theory of intra-party bargaining in which list positions shape the mobilization efforts of party activists in different factions. Our results allow us to link observable patterns in list allocations to the importance of consensus in intra-party negotiations. We empirically evaluate these predictions using data from Norwegian municipal elections. We exploit a wave of municipal mergers to identify candidates' geography-based factional affiliations. In line with our theory's functionalist logic and consensus-based bargaining, smaller factions are over-compensated in both safe and contested list positions, but more so in safe positions. Our theoretical and empirical results show that parties can promote consensus among their factions while maintaining mobilization incentives, indicating that equality and efficiency within a political organization can be simultaneously achieved.

Keywords: Party Factions; Intra-Party Power Sharing; Candidate Selection; Geographic Representation; Municipal Mergers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C78 D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:344254

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