Eponymous hedge funds

Vikas Agarwal, Yakup Eser Arisoy and Tri Trinh

No 25-07, CFR Working Papers from University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Abstract: We investigate whether eponymous hedge funds-those named after their founder/manager-signal managerial ability or ethical behavior. While such funds do not outperform non-eponymous peers, they exhibit lower operational and fraud risks. Survey evidence supports these findings. Eponymous funds that violate regulations and breach investors' trust experience reduced investor flows despite strong performance. Offsetting these costs, eponymous fund managers benefit from lower failure rates and better contractual terms such as higher incentive fees and greater share restrictions. These results suggest that eponymy serves as a credible signal of ethical behavior and personal commitment, valued by investors beyond performance alone.

Keywords: Eponymy; hedge funds; performance; signaling; reputation; trust; ethics; integrity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G40 G41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cfrwps:323936

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