European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg

No 2002-13, CSLE Discussion Paper Series from Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics

Abstract: In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

Keywords: European Union; comitology; principal-agent-relationship; structure-induced agent discretion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 K1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:csledp:200213

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