Trade, Trust And The Territoriality Of The Law

Dieter Schmidtchen and Alexander R. Neunzig

No 97-05, CSLE Discussion Paper Series from Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics

Abstract: In this paper we analyze whether trust can overcome the contractual hazards caused by the territoriality of law, how effective trust is and what the impact is on the sequential structure of trade. The paper contributes to the New Institutional Economics of International Transactions (NIEIT).

Keywords: international contract enforcment; trust game; bounded rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:csledp:9705

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