Enlargement of the European Union and the approximation of law: Lessons from an economic theory of optimal legal areas

Hans-Jörg Schmidt-Trenz and Dieter Schmidtchen

No 99-08, CSLE Discussion Paper Series from Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics

Abstract: Before joining the European Union countries from Central and Eastern Europe have to adopt the acquis communautaire, i.e. the system of legal rules developed in the Union. The paper outlines an economic theory of optimum legal areas, that is used to determine the optimal size of the Union as well as winners and losers of enlargement. The model also allows to identify an applicants dilemma: by adopting the acquis potential entrants reduce the probability of admittance to the club.

Keywords: Constitutional economics; social contract theory; optimum legal area; enlargement of the EU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F02 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:csledp:9908

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