Motivation by Status vs Reputation for Voluntary Contributions in Online Knowledge Exchange Communities

Michael A. Zaggl, Dennis M. Steininger and Andrew J. Isaak

EconStor Conference Papers from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: Performance feedback mechanisms play a pivotal role in motivating users’ voluntary contributions, which are crucial to sustaining online knowledge communities. We use motivation theory and conceptually distinguish reputation and status. Specifically, we hypothesize that reputation motivates contributions when users are of low status, but that achieved status will have a demotivating effect. We test our hypotheses by examining status and reputation mechanisms in a large knowledge exchange community (Stack Overflow). Consistent with our hypotheses, we find robust evidence that reputation-related performance feedback mechanisms are positively related to contribution behavior, whereas status-related mechanisms deplete motivation. Therefore, higher status crowds out the motivational effect of reputation-seeking. This study extends the literature on motivation in knowledge exchange communities by highlighting the difference between status and reputation as two opposing forces. Thereby, we also offer an explanation for the often-observed pattern of declining user contributions in online knowledge exchange communities.

Keywords: Knowledge Exchange; Crowdsourcing; Motivation; Status; Reputation; Panel Regression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D83 D91 J24 L86 M15 M50 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/338887/1/E ... n-Stack-Exchange.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esconf:338887

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EconStor Conference Papers from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().