The Finisher's Paradox: Handoff Quality in Deadline-Constrained Teams

Keisuke Hattori

EconStor Preprints from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Abstract: We study a team in which a contributor produces intermediate work and hands it to a finisher, who completes and submits it under a deadline. Because a more able finisher can absorb more within the deadline, the contributor anticipates the rescue and hands off less, so delivered quality can fall as the finisher grows more able - a finisher's paradox. The mechanism is a reversal: a binding deadline makes the contributor reduce his handoff as finisher ability rises, unlike in complementary teams without a time constraint. Once the handoff falls below the quality-maximizing split, delivered quality and the finisher's payoff fall while the contributor's payoff rises. When the finisher chooses the ownership allocation, she gives the contributor less credit than would maximize delivered quality. When deadline authority is delegated to the finisher under the same delay cost, she never chooses a later deadline than the organization, and delivered quality is no higher.

Keywords: team production; deadlines; sequential production; free-riding; delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 J24 L23 M12 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:esprep:342018

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