Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence

Dmitry Veselov and Alexander Yarkin

No 1444, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: Industrial policies, such as infrastructure investments and export tariffs, affect the allocation of labor and incomes across sectors, attracting substantial lobbying efforts by special interest groups. Yet, the link between structural change and lobbying remains underexplored. Using more than 150 years of data on parliamentary petitions in USA and Britain, we measure historical lobbying and document several stylized facts. First, lobbying over industrial policies follows a hump-shaped path in the course of structural change, while agricultural lobbying steadily declines. Second, big capitalists (manufacturers, merchants) are most active in lobbying for industrialization. Third, industrial concentration increases progressive lobbying, while concentrated landownership slows it down. We explain these patterns in a simple model of structural change augmented with a heterogeneous agents lobbying game. Model simulations match the dynamics of structural change, inequality, and lobbying for industrialization in the British data.

Keywords: political economy; structural change; lobbying; wealth distribution; growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 D72 N10 N41 O14 O41 O43 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro, nep-hme and nep-tid
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/297218/1/GLO-DP-1444.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence (2024)
Working Paper: LOBBYING FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2024)
Working Paper: Lobbying for Industrialization: Theory and Evidence (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1444

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