Let Me Check on You: Job Quality Under AI and Human Oversight

Milena Nikolova

No 1787, GLO Discussion Paper Series from Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Abstract: This paper provides the first causal evidence on how Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based workplace safety systems shape perceived job quality. I conducted a preregistered vignette experiment with a nationally representative sample of 2,172 Dutch adults who evaluated otherwise identical workplaces introducing one of three safety systems: i) human supervisors, ii) AI-only monitoring, or iii) hybrid AI-human supervision. Compared with human supervision, both AI-only and hybrid systems reduced perceived job satisfaction, work meaningfulness, and perceived social value of the job. Contrary to expectations, combining AI with human supervisors did not mitigate these negative effects. Respondents also viewed AI-based systems as less respectful of workers' privacy and dignity, despite viewing them as effective as human supervisors. Perceived fair wages changed little across conditions. These findings suggest that AI can influence work not only by improving safety but also by reducing important non-pecuniary dimensions of job quality, highlighting that the welfare consequences of workplace AI extend beyond productivity and accident prevention.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence (AI); safety systems; survey experiment; work meaningfulness; job quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I39 J01 J28 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:glodps:1787

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