Endogenous task allocation and intrafirm bargaining: A note

Martyn Marczak and Thomas Beissinger

No 01-2025, Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences from University of Hohenheim, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Abstract: We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding this mechanism in a model with strategic employment choice, we show how the properties of task-level technology affect the extent of over

Keywords: task approach; search and matching; Stole-Zwiebel bargaining; overhiring; wage bargaining; elasticity of complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 E23 J23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:hohdps:325479

DOI: 10.60848/13001

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