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Spurious middlemen in corrupt transactions

Güzin Bayar

Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), 2014, vol. 8, No 2014-42, 32 pages

Abstract: The first step in solving the problem of corruption lies in diagnosing its root causes and determining the underlying factors. One of the most important facilitators of corrupt transactions is intermediaries who make corrupt dealings less risky, thereby increasing corruption. Even worse, there are spurious intermediaries who obtain bribes in connection with public services by pretending to have power over the issue. This deception may be carried out even if the officer providing the public service in question is honest. The simple game theoretical model formulated in this article tries to capture the mechanisms behind such deception. From the solutions of the model, certain policy recommendations to prevent such a process from occurring shall be provided.

Keywords: Corruption; spurious middlemen; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-42
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/104994/1/807081973.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifweej:201442

DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2014-42

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