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Mutual Interest Development Cooperation: Aligning incentives in a fragmenting world

Tobias Heidland, Moritz Schularick and Rainer Thiele

No 5, Kiel Reports from Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Abstract: Development cooperation has lost credibility and political support. Despite large spending, few countries have achieved self-sustaining growth, and donor publics see aid as charity with weak returns. Geopolitical fragmentation, fiscal limits, and global shocks demand a new logic that aligns donor and partner country incentives instead of relying on conditionality or altruism. Mutual Interest Development Cooperation (MIDC) offers a new model: a rules-based menu of partnership tiers built on reciprocity, reform signals, and predictable financing. It aims to make cooperation simultaneously transformative for reforming states and politically legitimate for donors by ensuring visible, shared gains. The approach builds on initiatives and design components that have proven useful and combines these with a strong emphasis on the mutual interest of donor and partner countries.

Keywords: Foreign aid; Donor country benefits; Aid effectiveness; Development policy; Structural transformation; Mutual interest filter; Auslandshilfe; Vorteile für Geberländer; Wirksamkeit der Hilfe; Entwicklungspolitik; strukturelle Transformation; "Mutual Interest Filter" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkrp:344234

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