Closing pandora's box: How to improve the common reporting standard

Menusch Khadjavi and Marjolein Vertelman

No 2223, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: The 2021 pandora papers show that many wealthy individuals and even politicians use shell companies to hide their fortunes. In order to fight international personal tax evasion, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) was implemented and it helped governments to collect USD 85 billion already. USD 182 billion are still missing from the government budget because of personal tax evasion. The individual implementation strategies of CRS compliant countries can endanger the effectiveness of the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI). Several loopholes are used to circumvent the CRS. There are amendments possible which increase the effectiveness by improving the implementation strategies and closing the loopholes. The enforcement of the CRS should become stricter by removing financial institutions' licenses to operate in cases of non-compliance. Beneficial ownership registers should increase transparency regarding investments and securities. Within the current momentum of international tax legislation, the CRS compliant countries may leverage the USA into signing the CRS as well. The USA could in turn demand a more effective CRS before signing it.

Keywords: Common Reporting Standard (CRS); Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI); global taxevasion; improvements; loopholes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-iue
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/259804/1/1804592501.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2223

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().