Regulating network-based industries: the case of telecommunications

Henning Klodt

No 766, Kiel Working Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: A mandatory open-network-provision (ONP) by dominant firms is the appropriate government regulation in the presence of network externalities. For basic telephone services and online services, a permanent ONP regulation seems indispensable, whereas telecommunication networks only require transitional ONP regulation as long as public or privatized PTTs dispose of a dominant market position. Regulatory institutions tend to prefer either cost-plus or price-cap contracts for defining appropriate price-ceilings for network-access under ONP regulation. In order to avoid the specific disadvantages of both, governments should better apply incentive contract schemes which allow a sharing of efficiency gains among producers and customers.

JEL-codes: D82 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:766

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