Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance

Jerg Gutmann, Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska and Stefan Voigt

No 90, ILE Working Paper Series from University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics

Abstract: Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better compliance by the government with the constitution. Using an event study design to analyze constitutional changes in 171 countries between 1951 and 2020, we find that new constitutions lead to durable improvements in constitutional compliance in democracies. The effect of constitutional change in nondemocracies, however, is small and short-lived.

Keywords: constitution making; constitutional change; constitutional compliance; de jure-de facto gap; event study (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 H11 K10 K38 K42 P14 P26 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ilewps:90

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