Who's behind the wheel? Assessing internet regulatory agencies' autonomy from corporate interests

Elise Antoine

Internet Policy Review: Journal on Internet Regulation, 2026, vol. 15, issue 1, 1-35

Abstract: Global agencies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) play a central role in internet governance, developing the rules, guidelines, and procedures that shape both the functioning of the internet as a network and its broader use. Major technology firms and network infrastructure providers, such as Google, Cisco, and Microsoft, whose products both depend on and implement these rules, have strong incentives to participate in these venues. This paper examines which combinations of factors contribute to agencies' informal autonomy from corporate interests. Using a Qualitative Comparative Analysis supplemented by eleven interviews with senior officials, it finds that no single factor determines autonomy. Instead, informal autonomy results from specific configurations of four elements: the strength of formal rules supporting autonomy, the agency's age, the complexity of its policy domain, and the degree of media attention it receives. These findings provide a more nuanced understanding of when autonomy is favoured or constrained, raising important questions about the legitimacy of key agencies involved in internet governance, whose decisions can shape both individual rights and market structures.

Keywords: Internet governance; Network infrastructure; Autonomy; Internet regulatory agencies; Corporate interests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iprjir:339542

DOI: 10.14763/2026.1.2088

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