The phantom of Palais Brongniart economic patriotism and the Paris stock exchange

Helen Callaghan and Paul Lagneau-Ymonet

No 10/14, MPIfG Discussion Paper from Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

Abstract: French governments are famous for promoting national champions, notably by preventing foreign takeovers, but in 2005-2006, the Villepin administration allowed the New York Stock Exchange to take control of Euronext, a French-led pan-European company that includes the Paris Bourse. By mapping the public discourse surrounding this striking case of non-intervention, we explain why opponents of the transatlantic merger failed in their appeals to economic patriotism. Discursive strategies designed to justify discrimination against territorially defined outsiders ran into several hurdles, including weak patriotic sentiments for the company concerned; a lack of patriotic alternatives to the proposed merger; and the questionable patriotic credentials of those demanding intervention. Our findings advance research on the demand side of economic patriotism including its discursive dimension. Beyond that, they inform research on business-government relations, and on the political implications of corporate ownership structures.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:1014

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