Household taxation, consumption insurance, and welfare
Christian Bredemeier,
Jan Hendrik Gravert and
Falko Jüßen
No 1228, Ruhr Economic Papers from RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen
Abstract:
We reexamine joint taxation of couples in the presence of wage risk and incomplete insurance markets. By linking spouses' marginal tax rates, joint taxation changes how households use labor supply to self-insure consumption against wage shocks. This creates an insurance advantage of joint taxation worth 1.61 percent of con sumption in a calibrated life-cycle model. It largely offsets the disadvantages of joint taxation, though not completely in the current economic and policy environment. Joint taxation can become welfare-preferred at higher tax progressivity and, when progressivity is optimized separately under each system, joint and separate taxation deliver essentially identical welfare.
Keywords: Joint versus separate taxation; Progressivity; Earnings risk; Consumption insurance; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D15 D52 H21 H24 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:rwirep:344506
DOI: 10.4419/96973413
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