Agentic AI, corporate communication, and market integrity

Kevin Bauer and Katja Langenbucher

No 113, SAFE Policy Letters from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used in corporate communication with investors, including drafting disclosures, answering queries, and summarizing financial information. While these systems can improve the accessibility and efficiency of public corporate communication, they also create risks for market integrity, such as inaccurate statements, unintended disclosure of sensitive information, and unequal access through personalized responses. This paper argues that existing disclosure and market-abuse frameworks remain substantively adequate but require clearer operational expectations for AI-driven communication. AI outputs delivered through issuer-controlled channels should be treated as corporate communications attributable to the issuer. A risk-based regulatory approach should therefore require governance oversight, separation of public and confidential data, safeguards against manipulation, auditable records of AI outputs, and human oversight for market-sensitive communications. Properly governed, agentic AI can enhance investor access to public information while preserving the principles of accurate, timely, and equal disclosure.

Date: 2026
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