Extreme justifications fuel polarization

Christiane Buschinger, Markus Eyting, Florian Hett and Judd B. Kessler

No 449, SAFE Working Paper Series from Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Abstract: How does polarization - as measured by mistreatment of political rivals - spread? In an online experiment, participants choose between splitting financial resources equally or discriminating against a member of the opposing political party. We vary the information subjects receive about others' choices and justifications for discrimination. Exposure to extreme justifications for discrimination increases discrimination - particularly in a polarized environment, when many others are already discriminating - and it leads participants to adopt more extreme justifications themselves. Our findings suggest a self-reinforcing dynamic that may fuel polarization: Exposure to extreme statements increases polarization and the prevalence of extreme reasoning.

Keywords: political polarization; peer effects; justifications; outgroup discrimination; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D01 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:safewp:320434

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.5278740

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