On the overconfidence-effect in teams

Hanke Wickhorst

No 3/2010, Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics from University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses the effects of overconfidence on a coordination problem within a team of two agents and in the presence of effort complementarities. We show that in several settings an overconfidence bias or the mere anticipation of having an overconfident partner might not only help mitigate the coordination problem but also result in a Pareto improvement.

JEL-codes: D21 D62 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:umiodp:32010

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