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Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: The competition policy indexes

Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Competition and Innovation from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow crosscountry and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005.

Keywords: Competition Policy; Indicator; Deterrence; Competition Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51214/1/614785065.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: MEASURING THE DETERRENCE PROPERTIES OF COMPETITION POLICY: THE COMPETITION POLICY INDEXES (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the Competition Policy Indexes (2009) Downloads
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