Mercenaries in civil wars, 1950-2000

Söldner in Bürgerkriegen, 1950-2000

Sven Chojnacki, Nils Metternich and Johannes Münster

Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of mercenary participation in civil wars during the second half of the 20th century. We present a new dataset on mercenary activities and use it to test hypotheses derived from a simple gametheoretic model of demand and supply in the market for force. We find that higher GDP and diamond deposits in a country increase the probability that mercenaries fight in an internal war. Military interventions also increase the risk of mercenary involvement, with the exception of UN interventions.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51139/1/614779790.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200905

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().