The politicization of international security institutions: The UN security council and NGOs
Die Politisierung internationaler Sicherheitsinstitutionen: Der UN-Sicherheitsrat und NGOs
Martin Binder
Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance from WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Abstract:
This paper examines the politicization of the United Nations Security Council (SC) and seeks to explore the causes and effects of this process. I will first demonstrate that the SC has expanded both its scope and authority after the end of the Cold War. With the SC becoming more powerful I then consider whether the Council has become the target of politicization and has met with criticism and resistance. I find that there is an on-going, observable process of politicization although the SC is significantly less contested than a number of other international organizations. Regarding the possible effects of politicization, the paper examines whether and to what extent the Security Council has adapted its institutional design. I find that the Council has—hesitantly— opened up to civil society actors, although interaction with NGOs is limited to an informal consultation process coupled with broad discretionary power of the SC’s Permanent Members. In the concluding part of the paper I briefly examine how this outcome might be best explained and offer some hypotheses for further research.
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbtci:spiv2008305
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