A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis

Christian Ewerhart

No 410, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In this note, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH holds true, then any game in this family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to defi ne the family of games.

Keywords: Riemann hypothesis; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-03, Revised 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Journal Article: A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis (2024)
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