Environmental Tax Reform: Efficiency and Political Feasibility

Stefan Felder and Reto Schleiniger

No 13, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: Command-and-control measures, despite their inefficiencies, are still the standard in environmental policy. This might be due to the fact that command-and-control instruments prevent monetary redistribution between sectors and households and leave property rights on remaining pollution with the emittents. The present paper interprets the no-redistribution policy as a political constraint and investigates on more efficient alternatives to command-and- control, using a computable general equilibrium model for Switzerland. Simulation results render schemes that refund environmental tax revenues by a sector-by-sector-subsidy on labor or output as welfare enhancing.

Keywords: Environmental tax reform; price-standard-approach; public choice; computable general equilibrium model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 H22 H23 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:013

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