Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly

Dimitry Rtischev

Gakushuin Economic Papers, 2012, vol. 49, issue 2, 133-142

Abstract: Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility constraints from the perspective of strategic management.

Keywords: oligopolistic competition; strategic commitment; strategic delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abc:gakuep:49-2-4

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