Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly

Dimitry Rtischev

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility constraints from the perspective of strategic management.

Keywords: oligopolistic competition; strategic commitment; strategic delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Gakushuin Economic Papers 2.49(2012): pp. 133-142

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40891/1/MPRA_paper_40891.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40891

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().