Extra-contractual Incentives and Ex Post Behavior in Relationships between Shopping and Store

Valter Afonso Vieira

RAC - Revista de Administração Contemporânea (Journal of Contemporary Administration), 2016, vol. 20, issue 4, 477-501

Abstract: Kashyap, Antia and Frazier (2011) studied the effects of extra contractual incentives and monitoring over franchisee enforcement. Heide, Wathne and Rokkan (2007) found significant interactions among the types of monitoring, damaging opportunism. This paper extends prior discussion of monitoring and incentives over performance, for which we did not find evidence in the literature. We studied an industrial relationship between a store and its shopping center management. The results showed that the dependence on shopping center expertise, monitoring and compliance policy were associated with performance. Second, monitoring interferes in these direct relationships, moderating them. Specifically, the moderating effect decreases or increases store performance. Third, results show these inverted U-shaped associations better explained performance.

Date: 2016
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