Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent
Claude Crampes () and
Corinne Langinier ()
Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1998, issue 49-50, 265-288
This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.
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Working Paper: Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents (2000)
Working Paper: Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:265-288
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